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Abstract
The paper describes a case study that explores the idea of building a planner with a neat semantics
of the plans it produces, by choosing some action formalism that is \ideal" for the planning
application and building the planner accordingly. In general|and particularly so for the action
formalism used in this study, which is quite expressive|this strategy is unlikely to yield fast and
ecient planners if the formalism is used navely. Therefore, we adopt the idea that the planner
approximates the theoretically ideal plans, where the approximation gets closer, the more run time
the planner is allowed. As the particular formalismunderlying our study allows a signicant degree
of uncertainty to be modeled and copes with the ramication problem, we end up in a planner
that is functionally comparable to modern anytime uncertainty planners, yet is based on a neat
formal semantics.
This paper is to appear in the Journal of Logic and Computation, 1994.
11 Background and Plan of the Paper
There is an increasing amount of work providing logical formalizations of planning systems or
of basics of such systems, e.g., [15, 18, 22]. The rationale is that formally rigorous descriptions
can help understanding the systems, their fundamental procedures, limitations and theoretical
complexity|and that formal description can simply serve as a more ecient tool than natural
language for communicating a system's essentials, as other sciences have experienced before.
There are in fact two ways to provide a planner with a neat formalization, or semantics. The
rst is the ex post way: The planner comes rst, and the attempt to formalize it, later; Lifschitz's
[15] semantics of strips [9] is the most prominent example, and it also demonstrates that the
planner implementors may have used implementation tricks that require a matching formalization
to be more intricate than expected. The second is the ex ante way: The basic formalization
comes rst, and the planner is implemented later; an example for that direction is Pednault's [18]
formalization for determining possibly context-dependent action eects using regression, with a
planner implementation provided by McDermott [16].
However, you don't get a planner for free using either way. It is not planners that are for-
malized by an action theory, but, naturally enough, actions and how they change world states
when applied. The purpose of an action formalism is to specify the reasoning about prerequi-
sites and consequences of actions that an ideally rational agent should perform. Consequently,
such formalisms are idealistic in the sense that they, e.g., need not take ecient implementability
into account. Planner implementations, on the other hand, must be realistic, having to deal with
scruy things like heuristic search strategies, ecient domain modeling, anytime behavior, or even
acceptable graphical user interfaces. It is, hence, understandable that action theoreticians and
planner implementors may talk dierent languages.
So, when we say that a particular action formalism underlies a particular planner, we intend
to mean only that the planner is, rstly, correct with respect to the formalism, i.e., the plans it
generates for a planning problem have the property to be executable in every domain correctly
modeled by the formalism and achieve the desired goals; we will call this property of plans their
correctness and completeness. Secondly, the planner is complete with respect to the formalism, i.e.,
if there is in the formalism a structure (e.g., a sequence) of actions representing a way to solve a
planning problem, then the planner will eventually nd a corresponding correct and complete plan.
As to designing your favorite graphical user interface or employing most tricky search strategies,
however, the action formalism gives you and burdens you with full freedom|within the limits of
correctness and completeness.
However, requiring correctness and completeness turns out to be overly strong if you want to
include the possibility of designing practical planners in the ex ante way of construction. Therefore,
we want to admit some more liberality and require only correctness in the limit for planners,
i.e., require that plans delivered be correct and complete, given an arbitrarily high amount of
computation time, but may deviate from correctness and completeness if the available time is
limited; however, the deviation must in some way be predictable or describable relative to the
underlying action formalism. Note that these ideas are not uncommon; they are closely related to,
e.g., anytime algorithms [7] and bounded optimality of [19].
The following hypothesis underlies the work presented here:
Building planners by approximating an action formalism in the ex ante way just sketched
works in principle for any reasonable such formalismand is a generally applicable method
for neat planner engineering,
(1)
where \reasonable" means in particular implementable. Note that this hypothesis contradicts the
view of Russel and Wefald [19]. They say,
that existing formal models, by neglecting the fact of limited resources for computation,
fail to provide an adequate theoretical basis on which to build a science of articial
intelligence. [19, p. 10, their emphasis]
2 2 THE ACTION FORMALISM
One intended side eect of this paper is to demonstrate why we think they are wrong here: It
is not the formalism that must take limited resources into account, but the interpretation of the
output of a resource-bounded planning system relative to the formalism.
We do not believe, let alone assume, that there is the one universal action formalism to rely
on. The variance in the required expressivity is huge for planners for dierent application domains
involving|or not involving, respectively|numerical time, parallel action execution, incomplete
situation descriptions, alternative action eects, or whatsoever. So, the problem is to nd a
method allowing a planner designer to choose one appropriately expressive formalism and guiding
how to build a planner on it that exhibits correctness in the limit.
We know of no such method yet. The purpose of this paper, then, is to describe a case study
in ex ante planner construction. We start from the possible worlds action formalism by Brewka
and Hertzberg [3] that is briey described in section 2. Section 3 develops the notion of plans
for the actions used and denes the concepts of correctness and completeness of plans relative to
the formalism. Section 4 deals with the question of how correctness in the limit can be dened in
this framework, and how to obtain it; the key issue for the denition is a function on plans that
rates their \degree" of correctness and completeness. Section 5 briey describes our actual planner
implementation pascale2; owing to the degree of uncertainty handled by the underlying action
formalism (namely, incomplete situation descriptions, context-dependent and alternative action
eects) and to the requirements of correctness in the limit, our case study yields as a byproduct
an anytime uncertainty planner that may be of interest in itself. Section 6 concludes and sketches
some open issues.
Figure 1 summarizes the main steps of our proposed way of turning an action formalism into
a planner in general (left column), the respective instances of these steps for the possible worlds
formalism in particular (right column), and the respective sections in this paper that deal with the
respective steps (middle column).
Single aspects of this work have been reported in [3, 23, 24], fromwhich texts this paper borrows
occasionally. Note that the formalism from [3] is only used as a tool here. Consequently, discussing
its strengths and weaknesses or relating it to comparable formalisms is out of the scope of this
paper, and we refer to the original article.
2 The Action Formalism
Under the hypothesis (1), we could carry out our case study using any reasonable action formalism
as presented, e.g., in [20]. As mentioned, the required expressivity of the planner sets lower
bounds on the formalism's expressivity. To illustrate that our proposed methodology for planner
construction is not restricted to classical planning|and, correspondingly, very restrictive action
formalizations|we build a planner able to handle
 underspecied initial situations,
 context-dependency of action eects, and
 alternative eects for an action applied in one context.
In fact, we will see below that considering uncertainty of this sort matches very well the anytime
behavior [7] that emerges naturally from the requirement of correctness in the limit.
The particular formalism we use is inspired by Ginsberg and Smith's [11], or rather by the cor-
rection of their formalism in [26]. As it is described in full detail in [3] and is only an instrument
within this paper, our presentation here is sketchy, without further motivation or discussion. Read-
ers familiar with [3] may safely skip this section or just skim through, to pick up the description
of the example domain used throughout the paper.
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Figure 1: The steps of turning action formalisms into planners, and the structure of the paper.
We assume a rst order language L that represents the application domain, where we assume
L to have a nite Herbrand base.
1
Each Herbrand model, respectively each corresponding con-
junction l
1
^    ^ l
n
of ground literals, is called a world. We will deliberately switch between set
and conjunctive notation for worlds, i.e., we will use the notations l
1
^    ^ l
n
and fl
1
; : : : ; l
n
g
interchangeably. Similarly, we interpret sets of worlds as disjunctions of worlds.
Consider as an example the cup domain, which is inspired by [6]; Figure 2 is meant to vivify the
imagination. The task of a robot is to manipulate a cup from some position, using several actions
to be detailed later. The cup can be either on the oor (onoor) or on a table (ontable). When on
the oor, the cup can either stand upright (up), or be tipped forward with its mouth facing the
robot (forward), or be tipped backward (back). Experiments take place outside; thus rainy weather
(rainy) might aect the robot's performance. The language of the cup domain, L
c
, is the rst order
language induced by the ground atom set fonoor; ontable; up; forward; back; rainyg; a world is any
set of ground literals made of exactly these ground atoms. (As a notational convention, we will
use a subscript c for names referring to constructs in the cup domain.)
A situation is described by a formula s 2 L. Note that such a formula does not necessarily
describe the real situation in all detail, i.e., there may be many situations|and, correspondingly,
multiple worlds|in which some s is true. An example for such a non-unique situation description
in the cup domain is
s
c
= rainy ^ (ontable _ forward)
Knowledge about what is true in all situations is represented in the two sets C and B. C is a set
of inference rules over L, called the causal background knowledge, and is used to express directed
(\causal") relationships. The term Theory(C) denotes the set consisting of implications f
1
! f
2
for each inference rule f
1
) f
2
in C. The logical background knowledge B is a set of formulas from
1
The latter assumption is not strictly necessary, but simplies the presentation.
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Figure 2: An illustration of the cup domain.
L that are true in all situations; examples for such formulas are general laws, constraints, and
formulas introduced for terminology. As a shorthand notation, K = Theory(C) [ B denotes the
background knowledge in sum.
In the cup domain, we assume that bringing about up, forward, or back, respectively, causes
the other two to become false and causes the cup to be onoor (independently of whether or not
it was there before); moreover, if all three of up, forward, back are turned false, this causes the cup
to be ontable. This is to be expressed in the causal background knowledge C
c
. Finally, we dene
that onoor if and only if :ontable, i.e., we exclude any third location by denition; this must be
expressed in the logical background knowledge B
c
. Hence, B
c
, C
c
, and K
c
are given by
B
c
=

onoor $ :ontable
	
C
c
=
8
>
>
<
>
:
up ) :forward ^ :back ^ onoor;
forward ) :up ^ :back ^ onoor;
back ) :forward ^ :up ^ onoor;
:up ^ :forward ^ :back ) :onoor
9
>
>
=
>
;
K
c
=
8
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
ontable $ :onoor;
up ! :forward ^ :back ^ onoor;
forward! :up ^ :back ^ onoor;
back ! :forward ^ :up ^ onoor;
:up ^ :forward ^:back ! :onoor
9
>
>
=
>
>
>
;
Only worlds consistent with the background knowledge K are possible. That intuition is made
precise in the following denition:
Denition 1 (Possible worlds in s) Let s 2 L be a formula and let K  L be a set of formulas.
The possible worlds in s with respect to K are all worlds consistent with K and s, i.e., the elements
of the set
Poss
K
(s) = fw j w is a world and K [ fsg 6j= :wg
We use Poss
K
as a shorthand for Poss
K
(true), i.e., for the set of all worlds possible with respect
to K alone.
In the example of the cup domain with K
c
and s
c
as dened above, we have
Poss
K
c
(s
c
) =

W
1
= frainy;:forward;:back;:up;:onoor; ontableg;
W
2
= frainy; forward;:back;:up; onoor;:ontableg

5where the W
i
are names for later reference. Poss
K
c
consists of W
1
, W
2
, and the following other
worlds, which we present as we will occasionally refer to them:
W
3
= frainy;:forward; back;:up; onoor;:ontableg;
W
4
= frainy;:forward;:back; up; onoor;:ontableg;
W
5
= f:rainy;:forward;:back;:up;:onoor; ontableg;
W
6
= f:rainy; forward;:back;:up; onoor;:ontableg;
W
7
= f:rainy;:forward; back;:up; onoor;:ontableg;
W
8
= f:rainy;:forward;:back; up; onoor;:ontableg
Below, actions will be dened that change situations by making certain postconditions true
as a result of their application. In that context, it will be required to express that some formula
(describing the original situation) is in some sense minimally dierent from some other formula
(describing the resulting situation), where a third formula (the action's postcondition) is true. To
make the concept of minimal dierence precise, two supplementary denitions are needed, which
in turn require some additional terminology.
Let w
1
; w
2
be two sets of ground literals (e.g., two possible worlds). Di(w
1
; w
2
) denotes the
set of ground literals true in w
2
, but not in w
1
. In the cup domain, we have, for example,
Di(W
1
;W
2
) = fforward; onoor;:ontableg and
Di(W
2
;W
1
) = f:forward;:onoor; ontableg
For a set C of inference rules, the C-closure of some set of formulasF is the smallest deductively
closed formula set containing F that is also closed under the inference rules of C. As a shorthand,
F`
C
f denotes that some formula f is contained in the C-closure of F . For example, the C
c
-closure
of forward contains :up ^ :back ^ onoor, as dictated by the inference rules in C
c
, and hence also
contains :up and :back and onoor; rainy, e.g., is not included.
Armed with this terminology, one can now dene a concept denoting a minimal set of changes
transforming a world w
1
into another world w
2
, given some background knowledge K. The idea
is that the \essential" changes are computed using C, and B is used to determine the additional
\trivial" ones, if any.
Denition 2 (Causal change set) Let K = Theory(C) [ B be the background knowledge, w
1
and w
2
possible worlds, and w
0
2
 w
2
. A set of formulas S is called a causal change set of (w
1
; w
2
),
i S is a minimal subset of Di(w
1
; w
2
) such that S [ (w
1
\w
2
) `
C
w
0
2
and w
0
2
[B ` w
2
.
Note that a pair of worlds may have multiple causal change sets. In the cup domain, fforwardg is
the unique causal change set for (W
1
;W
2
).
2
Causal change sets are now used to determine closeness between possible worlds:
Denition 3 (Closeness, 
w
) Let w, w
1
and w
2
be possible worlds. w
1
is closer to w than w
2
,
denoted w
1

w
w
2
, i
 Di(w;w
1
)  Di(w;w
2
), or
 every causal change set of (w;w
1
) is a subset of a causal change set of (w;w
2
), and not vice
versa.
We use the term w-Closest
K
(f) as a shorthand notation to denote the set of possible worlds wrt.
K that are 
w
-minimal among the worlds satisfying f .
2
To see that fforwardg is a causal change set, note that
fforwardg [ (W
1
\W
2
) `
C
c
frainy; forward;:back;:up;onoorg =: W
0
2
;
and that W
0
2
[B
c
`W
2
.
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As a cup domain example, consider the possible world W
6
. The single causal change set of
(W
1
;W
6
) is f:rainy; forwardg. Therefore, using the results of previous examples, W
2

W
1
W
6
.
Finally, actions and the result of applying them are dened. The possible worlds formalization
adopts the common idea that actions are described by pre and postconditions. Crucially for the
formalism, actions can have dierent eects in dierent contexts (imagine the action of toggling a
lightswitch that has the eect of switching the light on if it was o before, and vice versa); and
actions can have alternative eects in the same context (imagine the action of tossing a coin that
may result in heads or tails). The syntactic appearance of an action is then dened as follows:
Denition 4 (Action description) An action description of m contexts is a structure of the
form
[ Pre
1
j Post
1;1
; : : : ;Post
1;l(1)
;
.
.
.
Pre
m
j Post
m;1
; : : : ;Post
m;l(m)
];
where the preconditions Pre
i
and the postconditions Post
i;j
are arbitrary formulas from L such
that Pre
1
_    _ Pre
m
is equivalent to true, and the Pre
i
are mutually exclusive.
As an example from the cup domain, consider the action table2up meant to describe moving
the cup from the table to its upright position on the oor. When the cup is originally on the
table, the action can produce either the intended eect, i.e., up, or it can fail in the sense that the
action results in the cup's position forward (which, by K
c
, implies :up). In all other contexts, the
action fails in the sense that nothing is changed. Note that this way of modeling action failure is
very generous; in general, failure might result in any sort of damage on the cup's or robot's side
or unpredictability of the successor situation. The formalism allows this to be expressed|but we
use the generous way throughout the paper for ease of presentation. The action table2up is then
described by
3
table2up = [ :rainy ^ ontable j up; forward;
rainy ^ ontable j up; forward;
:ontable j true ]
To x the meaning of the syntactical action descriptions, the concept of closeness between
possible worlds is used. If, for an action , Pre
i
is true in s, the idea is that  results in a set of
possible worlds, each of which verify some Post
i;j
, and each of which are closest to s. Formally:
Denition 5 (Result of an action in s) Let K = Theory(C)[B be background knowledge, s
a formula, and  an action given by an action description ofm contexts. The result of applying  in
s under K, denoted r
K
(; s), is the set of all possible worlds w
0
satisfying the following condition:
There are w 2 Poss
K
(S), i 2 f1; : : : ;mg, and j 2 f1; : : : ; l(i)g, such that
 K [ fwg j= Pre
i
and
 w
0
2 w-Closest
K
(Post
i;j
), i.e.,w
0
is
w
-minimal among the possible worlds satisfying Post
i;j
.
Recall that we consider a set of possible worlds as identical to their disjunction.
As a cup domain example, let us compute r
K
c
(table2up; s
c
). As demonstrated before, Poss
K
c
(s
c
)
consists of the two possible worlds W
1
and W
2
. Applying table2up in W
2
is uninteresting in the
sense that it does not lead to any changes (as :ontable is true in W
2
). Consequently, W
2
is an
element of the result.
3
You may think the two dierent contexts :rainy^ontable and rainy^ontable with identical postconditions seem
odd. You are right. Normally, one could unite them under the identical precondition ontable. However, we will
later, when dealing with limited correctness, inject additional information into the action description, specifying
that the action is more likely to fail in rainy weather (as the cup may get slippery, say). So, the distinction simply
anticipates later enhancements of our application example.
7Then, consider W
1
, i.e., context number 2 of table2up gets applied as Pre
2
is true. For Post
2;2
,
i.e., the formula forward, we did all the necessary calculation in the examples before. The 
W
1
-
minimal world satisfying forward is good old W
2
. That means, applying table2up in W
1
may lead
to W
2
, namely, if Post
2;2
happens to occur. For Post
2;1
, i.e., the formula up, one can check that
the possible world W
4
is 
W
1
-minimal among those satisfying up. In sum, r
K
c
(table2up; s
c
) =
fW
2
;W
4
g.
Note that in the description of table2up, it is unnecessary to specify that the weather is unaf-
fected and that the cup is not on the table any more. This is an example of the formalism's dealing
with the frame and ramication problems.
3 Plans
We now turn to the issues of dening plans for the type of actions as used in the possible worlds
formalization, and we will dene correctness and completeness of plans, and correctness and com-
pleteness of planning procedures accordingly. We are still on the theory level here, not yet at
implementation: It is the purpose to provide the concepts in terms of which the planner imple-
mentation can then be described and evaluated.
We give the denitions for problem description, plan, plan correctness, and plan completeness
suitable for the possible worlds formalism here, but it should be emphasized that these notions are
essential for building a planner based on any action formalism, although they will look dierent
for dierent formalisms. So, the point here in view of the general methodology for turning action
formalisms into planners is: the respective denitions must be provided in a form suitable for the
respective formalism. The other notions we give here (planner, planner correctness, and planner
completeness) are independent of the possible worlds formalism and may be used literally for
building planners on any other one.
We start with the denition of a planning problem description. As this denition is pretty
classical, it should be understood without lengthy explanation:
Denition 6 (Planning problem description ) Let L be a rst order language. A planning
problem description (or problem, for short, if this causes no confusion) is a quadruple 	 =
(s; g;K;A), where
 s 2 L, the initial situation, is a formula,
 g 2 L, the goal, is a formula,
 K  L, the background knowledge, is a set of formulas, and
 A, the action inventory, is a set of action descriptions.
Remember that the background knowledge K is assumed to equal Theory(C) [ B for some C;B
throughout the paper, even if we do not mention C and B explicitly.
This is the point to present the other cup domain actions to prepare for stating the full action
inventory for problems to come. In addition to table2up, we have the actions shown in Figure 3,
with the following intuition behind:
back2up To move the cup from the back position to the up position. The action is guaranteed to
work if it is not rainy; if it is rainy, it may succeed or fail (changing nothing); in all contexts
where :back holds, it fails (again, changing nothing).
spin To (possibly) change the cup from the forward or back position into the forward or back
position, where a change may occur from either of the two to either of the two. The action
fails, i.e., nothing changes, if :(forward _ back) holds.
8 3 PLANS
back2up = [ :rainy ^ back j up;
rainy ^ back j up; true;
:back j true ]
spin = [ forward _ back j forward; back;
:(forward _ back) j true ]
wait = [ rainy j :rainy; true;
:rainy j rainy; true ]
Figure 3: Additional actions for the cup domain.
wait To just wait and do nothing. The weather may or may not change from rainy to :rainy, or
vice versa.
4
Our favorite cup domain problem for the rest of this text is then
	
c
= (s
c
; up;K
c
; ftable2up; back2up ; spin;waitg);
That means, the problem is to get into a situation where up is true, starting from s
c
, applying
some of the actions, with K
c
as the background knowledge.
Let us now turn to dening plans. In the framework of the possible worlds action formalization,
plans can obviously not have the structure of classical plans, i.e., a set of actions and a strict linear
or non-linear order on this set; this structure is inappropriate if actions, like all of the above, may
yield non-unique successor situations. We need something dierent, then.
Our plan denition is guided by the following idea. Even if a plan cannot be given as an action
sequence, it should after all direct what action to execute next, once the executor nds itself in a
situation matching a certain possible world. Moreover, the plan should tell which possible worlds
are expected to result from executing the action, according to the domain representation. Note
that there are only nitely many possible worlds. Hence, a plan is a nite structure, consisting of
possible worlds and actions; it directs which action to execute in each possible world expected to
emerge; and it tells which possible worlds are expected to result from each such action execution.
We represent a plan as a bipartite directed graph, consisting of T -nodes and W -nodes. Each
T -node is meant to represent an action occurrence (or task), and each W -node a possible world;
each node is labeled with the action whose occurrence it represents, or with the world it represents,
respectively.
Denition 7 (Plan) Let 	 = (s; g;K;A) be a planning problem description, and let start be an
action such that start = [true j w
1
; : : : ; w
n
], where fw
1
; : : : ; w
n
g = Poss
K
(s). A plan  for 	 is a
bipartite directed graph consisting of labeled T - and W -nodes with a unique root, where:
1. The root is a T -node called Start; it is labeled with start. Every other T -node is labeled
with an element of A.
2. Every W -node is labeled with an element of Poss(K). No two W -nodes are labeled with the
same world.
3. All leaves are W -nodes.
4
Note that this may be considered ontological cheating. While all other actions' eects can be viewed as eected
by the respective actions, this is certainly not true for a weather change by waiting. Although we think it can
consistently be included, the possible worlds formalization does not provide a means to express external events that
may or may not occur independently from executing actions. The only excuse for using this cheated formulation is
that it works here.
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Figure 4: Plan 
c
for 	
c
. The atoms ry; fd ; bk ; up; of ; ot, respectively, abbreviate rainy, forward,
back, up, onoor, ontable, respectively.
4. T -nodes have only W -nodes as successors.
5. Every non-leaf W -node has exactly one T -node as successor; every non-root T -node has
exactly one W -node predecessor.
6. From every node, there is at least one path to a leaf.
In Figure 4, we show a cup domain plan for the example problem 	
c
dened earlier. T -nodes
are represented by boxes, W -nodes by ellipses. Both node types are labeled with the respective
corresponding tasks or worlds. The plan is to be interpreted as follows: If the world W
1
is true
at the start of the plan execution, then apply table2up. As demonstrated earlier, the two worlds
W
2
and W
4
may result; consequently, the respective W -nodes are the successors of the respective
T -node. Determine which of the possible outcomes of table2up is the actual outcome, and proceed
until you eventually reach a leaf.

c
has one single leaf, namely, the one labeled with W
4
. Considering the part of 
c
that
consists only of the Start node and W
1
;W
2
, this is also a plan; it contains the two leaves labeled
with W
1
;W
2
.
As these plans are only part of the demonstration substrate in our case study for planner con-
struction, we do not go into detail concerning the underlying execution model and the possibilities
to use them for execution monitoring, replanning, or reusing old plans. The interested reader may
nd hints about this in [23].
The example plan 
c
is rather exceptional, given the simple plan denition that we have: 
c
is meaningful in the sense that it correctly models the postconditions of all actions labeling its
T -nodes, as applied in their respective predecessor worlds. The plan denition does not enforce
that; it allows for W -nodes that have absolutely nothing to do with the worlds resulting from
applying their predecessor T -nodes.
Consequently, we have to dene plans that are \meaningful". We do so by dening correctness
and completeness for plans relative to the planning problem description 	. Note that we do not
attempt to formulate correctness with respect to the real world (or some relevant section of it);
that would have to be done for 	. It could be done along the lines that Lifschitz [15] has drawn
for dening the soundness of a strips system, but we simply assume in this text that planning
problem descriptions are proven to be sound with respect to the world section they are supposed
to model.
We start with correctness. The intuition behind it is to say that if a plan says that something
is or may be the case, then it really is or may be the case. In particular, if the plan execution
proceeds as a plan tells it, then the plan will rightly predict what may result from applying an
action in some situation, every action it directs to execute is in fact executable, and if it directs
to stop the plan execution, then a situation will have emerged in which the goal formula is true.
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(Remember that all this can, of course, only be guaranteed for a plan, if the planning problem
description itself was correct wrt. the real world domain.)
Note that we require only \partial" correctness here in the sense that the goal is true if the plan
directs the execution to stop; in general, we cannot guarantee that every plan execution as guided
by some plan will eventually lead to such a stop. The reason is that plans may contain loops out
of which there is syntactically a path to some leaf node (as required in item 6 of denition 7), but
we cannot guarantee that they will in fact eventually be left. As an example, see the spin loop in

c
in Figure 4: If spinning does in fact always result in forward, then executing the plan will cycle
innitely, if W
2
is reached once. Note, however, that the source of the trouble is the unsoundness
of the domain description in this case. For sound descriptions, we have indeed total correctness,
guaranteeing that the plan execution will eventually stop.
The correctness denition is given in steps: rst for individual nodes, and then for plans.
Denition 8 (Node correctness, plan correctness) Let  be a plan for the planning problem
description 	 = (s; g;K;A).
Root correctness: Start 2  is correct wrt. 	 i for every Start successor node ! labeled with
w in : w 2 Poss
K
(s)
Non-root T -node correctness: Let  be a non-root T -node in , labeled with , and let ! be
its predecessor in , labeled with w.  is correct wrt. 	 i for every successor !
0
of  in ,
!
0
is labeled with w
0
such that w
0
2 r
K
(;w).
Leaf correctness: A leaf ! 2  labeled with w is correct wrt. 	 i w [K ` g.
Plan correctness:  is correct wrt. 	, i
1. Start 2  is correct wrt. 	;
2. every non-root T -node in  is correct wrt. 	; and
3. every leaf node in  is correct wrt. 	.
The concept of plan completeness is related to plan correctness; the idea is to say: If something
may happen at plan execution according to 	, then the plan does already respect it. That means in
particular, the plan must represent all possible worlds of the initial situation, and it must contain
all results of actions that it directs to apply. Note that the issue is not that a plan must direct
what to do in every possible world in the domain or tell what the result is of applying every action
in each of the possible worlds it contains. As a plan is a plan, it deals only with the eects of the
particular actions it proposes to apply in the particular possible worlds it contains.
Denition 9 (Node completeness, Plan completeness) Let  be a plan for the planning
problem description 	 = (s; g;K;A).
Root completeness: Start 2  is complete wrt. 	 i for allw 2 Poss
K
(s) there exists a successor
! of Start in  such that ! is labeled with w.
Non-root T -node completeness: Let  labeled with  be a non-root T -node in , and let !
labeled with w be its predecessor in .  is complete wrt. 	 i for all w
0
2 r
K
(;w), there
exists a successor !
0
of  in  such that !
0
is labeled with w
0
.
Plan completeness:  is complete wrt. 	, i
1. Start 2  is complete wrt. 	; and
2. every non-root T -node in  is complete wrt. 	.
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Obviously, a correct and complete plan is the ideal plan that one would like a planner to
generate, namely, a \solution" to the planning problem, and these two requirements are the back-
ground for the vast majority of papers about planning|albeit mostly implicit. The reason to
make them explicit here is, of course, that we want to be able to deal with controlled relaxations
of plan correctness and completeness later; this will be the key for achieving limited correctness of
planners.
The notions of correctness and completeness apply analogously to plan generating procedures,
or planners, not only to plans. In our context, a planner is an entity that, given a planning
problem description, returns plans after a number of computation steps. These steps may be time
ticks or numbers of calls to a basic procedure; more generally, the steps can be interpreted as any
monotonically increasing time function. For simplicity, we assume a discrete measure over the
natural numbers here.
To formally dene a planner, we would, strictly speaking, have to specify a language for for-
mulating problem descriptions on that the planner operates. From the theoretical viewpoint we
take until now, this is merely a technical matter, which we omit here. We tacitly assume that all
problem descriptions are given in some appropriate language, involving the rst order language for
describing the domain and the language for describing the actions. Moreover, we assume the exis-
tence of types natural, problem description, and plan containing objects that are natural numbers,
problem descriptions, and plans, respectively. Under the theoretical view that we are still having
here, a planner is then somewhat impoverishedly dened as:
Denition 10 (Planner) A planner is a pair (P; A
P
) of functions. P, the plan generation func-
tion, is of the type
problem description ! natural ! plan
A
P
, the availability function, is a function of type problem description ! natural set, such that
P(	) is a total function on A
P
(	)  IN for every problem 	.
Intuitively, P is the planning procedure itself, and A
P
denes the set of steps at which P has a
plan for a problem available. An obviously interesting special case is a planner for which A
P
= IN,
i.e., a planner that has an output available after any number of steps|an any-step planner, as
one could call it. In fact, this is the direct analog to the now-famous anytime planners as rst
discussed in [7]; if time is considered to be discrete, then the any-step property generalizes the
anytime property.
The intuitive idea behind planner correctness or completeness, then, is simple: A planner is
correct wrt. some criterion to be specied, if and only if all the plans it delivers for a planning
problem meet the criterion; and it is complete, if and only if it eventually generates all plans for
the problem that meet some other to-be-specied criterion.
The obvious question is what these ominous criteria are supposed to be. In general, they
can specify everything you like; for example, one could dene correctness and completeness of
planners wrt. the criterion that plans contain exactly 17 tasks (but are not necessarily correct and
complete). The criterion that we will hard-wire into the denitions of both planner correctness
and completeness is supposed to be a bit more useful, at least as long as we remain on the theory
side: it is|somewhat unsurprisingly|plan correctness and completeness. That means that a
correct planner will deliver only correct and complete plans, and that a complete planner will
eventually deliver all correct and complete plans for a given problem. The respective denitions
are straightforward:
Denition 11 (Planner correctness) A planner (P; A
P
) is correct i the plan P(	)(t) is cor-
rect and complete wrt. 	 for all problems 	 and for all t 2 A
P
(	).
Denition 12 (Planner completeness) A planner (P; A
P
) is complete i, for all problems 	
and for all plans  that are correct and complete wrt. 	, there exists t 2 A
P
(	) such that
P(	)(t) = .
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Note that it is very easy to design planners that are either correct or complete. An example
for a trivially correct planner is one that returns no plan at all; all plans it returns are correct
and complete|it just returns no plan. An example for a trivially complete planner is one that
enumerates all plans (be they correct and complete or not); it will eventually also generate all
correct and complete plans. Hence, the interesting matter is to design planners that are correct
and complete.
At least, that is what pure theory tells. As exposed in the introduction of this paper, the issue
here is to develop planners that are correct in the limit; for this task, the \ideal" correctness as
just dened will just serve as a reference point. Dening this more liberal version of correctness is
what we will do in Section 4.
4 Correctness, Ltd.
We now turn to the problem of using the action formalism for planner construction. As said
earlier, in view of our goal to achieve planners that are only correct in the limit relative to the
formalism, we do not require that such a planner use a \direct" implementation of it. Given that
such formalisms may often be designed for criteria other than ecient implementability, this would
be unnecessarily restrictive. Instead, one may use a restriction of the formalism, or a formalism
implementation that in itself only approximates the pure formalism in the task of, say, determining
action eects. It is only the planner whose behavior we constrain: In the limit, it must be correct;
and meanwhile, its incorrectness must be describable relative to the ideal, as objectied by the
formalism. The formalism is a yardstick, not the Holy Grail.
Consequently, we have to do three things in order to achieve a well-dened concept of limitedly
correct planners:
1. Choose a convenient subset of the formalism. In case that the formalism is not implemented
in full generality, the restriction chosen must be characterized. Independently from that, if
the provided implementation just approximates the formalism's results, the approximation
behavior must be described. For the particular case of the possible worlds formalization, we
describe a restriction on subsets of full worlds that models the full formalism correctly under
some restrictions we will also specify; we will not use approximations.
2. Dene a rating for incomplete and incorrect plans. In case that the planner is supposed to
return incorrect and/or incomplete plans (at least after few steps), these must be rated in
order to guarantee at least an asymptotic convergence of the planner outputs towards correct
and complete plans. For the particular case of possible worlds plans, the rating we describe is
based on a notion of utility of nodes, and takes the probability of reaching them into account.
3. Dene correctness in the limit. Using the previous denitions, this denition of planner
behavior proves to be straightforward. Describing the particular case of our possible worlds
planner pascale2 is postponed until Section 5.
The three parts of this section deal with these three issues in turn; in particular, they exemplify
them in terms of the possible worlds action formalization and plans dened earlier.
4.1 Restricting the Formalism
4.1.1 Restricting Formalisms in General
The issue here is, then, to start looking at the underlying action formalism under the view of
implementability, and to restrict it accordingly, should this be deemed necessary. In this context,
two questions might require clarication.
The rst is whether substantially restricting a formalism in a well-dened way or providing a
well-dened approximation doesn't in fact yield a new formalism, which could then be directly used
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as a basis for the planner. In a way, this is true. However, it is a matter of empirical observation
(and of the target readership of the respective papers) that formal theories of action and the
typically only implicitly specied calculi underlying practical planners are of considerably dierent
nature. We do not think this is necessarily so, but there are good reasons for the empirically
observed gap, given the dierence of aims in designing a theory and in designing ecient code.
This section, then, is to acknowledge that this gap will exist in many, if not all cases, and that it
must be bridged for constructing planners in the way we propose here. The restricted version of
the formalism or an approximate calculus for it may of course be of its own interest, not only from
the practical side, but also theoretically.
The second question is whether action formalizations provide sucient expressivity for de-
scribing a domain in general and its actions in particular, for being suitable as a formal basis for
more modern planners. For example, few interesting modern planners will describe actions just by
preconditions and postconditions, but there will be time, a dierence between preconditions and
subgoals, plots, protection intervals, and others, see [12] for an overview. There are two answers
to this question. First, even if many existing action formalisms (like the possible worlds formalism
that still lacks incorporating, e.g., numerical time, concurrency, or external events) are severely
restricted in their expressivity, this need not stay that way; explicitly confronting them with the
needs of planning applications may even provide a push for examining greater expressivity. Second,
from the viewpoint of formalism, dierent features of an operator description language may well
be mapped onto the same formalism feature. For example, it makes perfect sense to pragmatically
dierentiate between goals and preconditions in an operator in sipe [25]; however, when mapping
the planner to the theory, they may both be mapped onto preconditions. The heuristic search
behavior of the planner takes advantage of the dierence, but this behavior is not to be mapped
back onto the formalism.
We will now continue presenting the case of our case study, and describe the restriction of the
formalism used further on.
4.1.2 Restricting the Possible Worlds Formalism
For the particular planner in this case study, we will go the way of using a mild simplication of the
possible worlds formalization that is, however, equivalent to the original under certain restrictions.
Of this, we will then use a relatively straightforward implementation.
By denition, there are only nitely many possible worlds. But nitely many can still be a lot,
especially as the number of worlds grows exponentially with the cardinality of the nite Herbrand
universe of L. Usually, only a fraction of all worlds is possible, but a fraction of an exponentially
growing number can still grow exponentially. Consequently, the size of worlds should be something
to worry about as we start turning towards building planners. We will sketch a way to both reduce
the size (although not the number) of the possible worlds and practically save dealing with the
rules in the causal background knowledge C. Part of this material is also drawn from [3], to which
we refer to further details.
There are two key ideas to the reduction. The rst is to save computation by computing results
of an action not for the possible worlds as dened, but for smaller \worlds" based only on a subset
L of the Herbrand universe of L, called L-worlds. For example, we could choose
L
c
= frainy; forward; back; upg
in the cup domain. Possible L-worlds can then be dened like possible worlds in Denition 1; just
substitute \world" by \L-world". We use the symbol j
L
as the notation of the restriction of some
set or function to L.
The second key idea is to choose L such that it allows the correct action eects to be computed
without using the inference rules of the causal background theory C, but from the formula set
K alone. To start with, dene the new versions of causal change set, closeness, and r
K
j
L
(; s)
(i.e., action results restricted on L-worlds), respectively, from the old denitions 2, 3, and 5,
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respectively, by again substituting \L-world" for \world", replacing every occurence of C by ;,
and every occurence of B by B [ Theory(C). (Note that K does not change, then.) Hence,
determining the possible worlds closest to some given world w and verifying some formula f , i.e.,
w-Closest
K
(f), reduces in its L-restricted form to comparing dierences between w and other
possible worlds verifying f . To sum up, the above-described changes for the L-world version of the
formalisms entail that
 the causal change set denition (Denition 2) is not needed any more
 the L-world version of the closeness denition (Denition 3) says that a possible L-world v
1
is closer to a possible L-world v than a possible L-world v
2
i Di(v; v
1
)  Di(v; v
2
).
The denitions of plans, correctness, and completeness then apply analogously to L-worlds.
An obvious requirement for L is that an L-world capture the \essence" of a corresponding \full"
world in the sense that it uniquely determine a full world, taking the background knowledge into
account. This is made precise in the following denition.
Denition 13 (Spanningness of L) A subset L of ground atomic formulas of L is called span-
ning wrt. the background knowledge K, i for every possible L-world v there is a unique possible
world w such that v [K ` w.
In the following, we assume that every L be spanning w.r.t. its respective K. In particular, it can
be veried that L
c
is spanning wrt. K
c
.
In some cases, working with the L-worlds variant of the possible worlds formalismyields results
that are logically equivalent to working with the original formalism. To give an example, let us
compute the result of applying table2up under K
c
in s
c
, restricted on L
c
, i.e., r
K
c
j
L
c
(table2up; s
c
).
The possible L-worlds in s
c
are
Poss
K
c
j
L
c
(s
c
) =

V
1
= frainy;:forward;:back;:upg;
V
2
= frainy; forward;:back;:upg

These L-worlds correspond to the worlds W
1
;W
2
in the original example using full worlds. Note
that, as an eect of L
c
's spanningness, the missing literals regarding ontable and onoor can be
deduced using K
c
. Like in the original example, applying table2up to V
2
simply yields V
2
, so we
restrict our considerations on V
1
. Here, the second precondition of table2up is true. Hence, we
must nd 
V
1
-minimal possible L-worlds satisfying up and forward, respectively.
Focusing on forward, V
2
is a possible L-world in which it is true; Di(V
1
; V
2
) is fforwardg;
clearly, V
2
is 
V
1
-minimal according to the new closeness denition. (Recall that causal change
sets are not used here.) Hence, it is an element of the result. Analogously, we obtain the possi-
ble L-world V
4
= frainy;:forward;:back; upg from the other postcondition formula up. In sum,
r
K
c
j
L
c
(table2up; s
c
) = fV
2
; V
4
g.
Now, as K
c
[ V
2
` W
2
and K
c
[ V
4
` W
4
, we happen to nd:
K
c
[ r
K
c
(table2up; s
c
) is logically equivalent to K
c
[ r
K
c
j
L
c
(table2up; s
c
):
This result is not incidental: the structure of the cup domain ensures that the equivalence holds
for all its actions and situations. Proving this claim is mostly a technical matter; as it is just of
marginal interest for the main point of this paper, we exile its proof to Appendix B.
The point to note is that we have identied a simplication of the possible worlds formalization
for which we need to use only L-worlds and can forget about the C-closure.
This simplication can be implemented considerably more eciently, owing mostly to the de-
crease in size of the L-worlds. Therefore, the planner we construct operates on L-worlds. In
exchange, this planner can safely be applied only to domains and Ls for which using L-worlds is
equivalent to using \full" worlds with C-closure. In Appendix B, we give sucient conditions under
which this equivalence holds in a planning domain (these conditions apply to the cup domain).
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Restricting the formalism in this way is no theoretical necessity for constructing planners from
action formalisms; but we believe it will often be helpful to speed them up. Remember, however,
that this restriction is not the only, and probably the less important idea for operating planners
under realistic run time constraints|the more important one being correctness in the limit, to be
dened in Section 4.3.
4.2 Rating Plans
4.2.1 Dening a Rating Function in General
Having chosen the appropriate restriction of the formalism, i.e., of the possible worlds formalism
in our case, the issue is now to dene a rating for incorrect and incomplete plans, on which to base
later the planner's asymptotic convergence towards delivering correct and complete plans.
The general idea of a plan rating function is very simple. We want to have a function that,
given a plan, determines the \degree" of its correctness and completeness, supplementing the sharp
notions of correctness and completeness with a gradual valuation for plans that are not correct
and complete|i.e., the vast majority of plans that planners practically deal with. Normalizing the
values of rating functions to the real interval [0; 1], we get:
Denition 14 (Rating function) Let 	 be a planning problem description. A rating function
for 	 is a total function %
	
mapping plans for 	 to [0; 1], such that for every plan :
%
	
() = 1 i  is correct and complete wrt. 	
For brevity, we again skip dening the language for specifying planning problem descriptions. In
eect, we sloppily speak of some % as a family of rating functions, to express that %
	
is a rating
function for every problem 	.
Note that we do not require that rating functions are the only functions evaluating the \quality"
of plans. In particular, a rating function does not select between dierent correct and complete
plans; measures like plan execution cost, or plan generation time, however, are practically impor-
tant for a planner to deliver \good" plans, whatever the denition of \good" is in detail. We
assume a rating function can be a component of an overall plan evaluation measure, but make
no requirements as to whether or not this is the case, whether or not additional plan evaluation
functions exist, or how they look like. For dening planner correctness in the limit, rating functions
are required, and only these.
An obvious example for a rating function|or even family of rating functions|is the sigmoid
function  assigning 1 to all correct and complete plans, and 0 to all others. As we will below
dene a considerably more sophisticated rating function for possible world plans, mapping plans
to the whole [0; 1] interval, one might suspect that such a sophisticated function is in some respect
generally \better" than . This is wrong. There may be domains where plans that are not correct
and complete in the strong sense, are of absolutely no value, making  the perfect rating function.
The point is that the domain modeler denes, of what value a non-correct-and-complete plan is
by dening a rating function.
This ends the general part of this Section 4.2. All the rest concerns dening a suitable rating
function for the case of the possible worlds plans as dened in Section 3. For dening the function,
we pursue the following idea. Given the points at which the possible worlds formalism allows
for uncertainty, i.e., for multiple possible worlds of the start situation and dierent alternative
postconditions of actions applied in a possible model, we allow (not force!) the user to inject
information about the a-priori and relative probabilities of possible worlds. This information is
then used for handling possible worlds by applying results of Nilsson's probabilistic logic [17]. We
describe this in Section 4.2.2. In Section 4.2.3, we transfer this probability information to plans;
this is done using basic techniques from Markov chain theory and utility theory.
5
In Section 4.2.4,
we nally dene the particular rating functions on possible worlds plans.
5
All denitions in the sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 will be given for L-worlds. They apply for \full" worlds accordingly.
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Let us emphasize that the choice of using probability information to develop a plan rating is
special to the case of our case study; it is in no way required by our view of planner construction
on some action formalism. Alternative ways to develop such a rating for planners based on the
possible worlds formalism in particular might include using possibility theory [8] or some variant
of Spohn's [21] model; in general, for planners based on other formalisms, completely dierent,
maybe considerably simpler ways may be appropriate. The point is: one has to choose some such
way, and we demonstrate one that is particularly appropriate for the possible worlds formalism
and leads to somewhat interesting planners.
And let us express a mild warning, before starting on this way. Remember that the possible
worlds action formalization allows coping with missing information, e.g., about the start situa-
tion. It is then reasonable to demand that a plan rating cope with the acquisition of additional,
uncertainty-reducing information by updating the rating accordingly, i.e., that the rating be dy-
namic in this respect. This does not require highly sophisticated math in our case, but dening the
rating takes more eort than one would expect for, say, some reasonable rating function operating
on classical nonlinear plans. The case we study is just not the simplest conceivable one.
4.2.2 Injecting Probability Information into the Possible Worlds Formalism
As for using probability theory to quantify beliefs in our action formalism, we start by assuming
that the a-priori probability of some domain facts are given as a set P of probability values for
the corresponding sentences in L. The probabilistic background knowledge, called P , expresses the
constraints, if any, that must hold for the probability distribution on possible L-worlds at any time,
in absence of information beyond K. For the cup domain, we have
P
c
= f p(rainy) = 0:4; p(forward _ back) = 0:7; p(ontable) = 0:2 g
expressing, e.g., that, lacking further information, the weather has a 40% chance to be rainy.
Results from Nilsson's probabilistic logic can be used to compute the a-priori probability dis-
tribution p over the possible L-worlds space, that strictly reects K and P , no more, and no less.
The main result we use from Nilsson's work is that the probability of a sentence is the sum of the
probabilities of the possible L-worlds in this sentence.
6
p is dened as follows:
Denition 15 (A-priori probability distribution) Let K and P be the logical and the proba-
bilistic background knowledge, respectively. The a-priori probability distribution over the possible
L-worlds space, noted p, is the probability distribution dened by:
p(true) = 1 =
X
v2 Poss
K
j
L
p(v) (2)
8p(s) 2 P p(s) =
X
v2 Poss
K
j
L
(s)
p(v) (3)
for which the entropy, dened as  
P
v2 Poss
K
j
L
p(v) log p(v), is maximal.
Equation (2) expresses that a tautology has truth-probability 1, and Equation (3) that p must
comply with the probability values given in P . In general, these two equations still induce an
innity of probability distributions. Among them, we select the p with maximal entropy, because
this distribution assumes minimal additional information beyond K and P . The probability dis-
tribution p for the cup domain is shown in Figure 5 and can be computed following the lines given
in [4]. Lacking further knowledge, it constitutes the robot's belief about the current situation of
the world.
6
Nilsson's result applies primarily to \full" possible worlds. However, it is also applicable to L-worlds here,
because spanningness ensures that possible L-worlds are mutually exclusive and exhaustive not only with respect
to L, but also to L.
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V 2 Poss
K
c
j
L
c
p(V )
V
1
f rainy;:forward;:back;:up g 0:08
V
2
f rainy; forward;:back;:up g 0:14
V
3
f rainy;:forward; back;:up g 0:14
V
4
f rainy;:forward;:back; up g 0:04
V
5
f :rainy;:forward;:back;:up g 0:12
V
6
f :rainy; forward;:back;:up g 0:21
V
7
f :rainy;:forward; back;:up g 0:21
V
8
f :rainy;:forward;:back; up g 0:06
Figure 5: A-priori probability distribution p for the cup example
It is straightforward to revise this probability distribution in order to reect additional informa-
tion about the current world situation. If s 2 L describes this situation, our belief that a possible
L-world corresponds to the actual situation is revised using Bayesian conditioning, which can be
viewed as the probabilistic counterpart of belief revision in the sense of [10]. The revised proba-
bility distribution p
s
on L-worlds is such that p
s
(v) = p(vjs), where p(vjs) denotes the conditional
probability of v given s. Using Bayes's theorem, this can easily be shown to be equivalent to the
following denition:
Denition 16 (Revised probability distribution) Let p be the a-priori probability distribu-
tion over the possible L-worlds space, K the background knowledge, and s 2 L a formula. The
revision of p given that s holds, noted p
s
, is the probability distribution dened by
p
s
(v) =
(
p(v)
P
v
0
2 Poss
K
j
L
(s)
p(v
0
)
if v 2 Poss
K
j
L
(s)
0 otherwise.
For example, if the current situation is described by s
c
, the real situation of the world corresponds
to one of the two possible L-worlds V
1
and V
2
with respective probability:
p
s
c
(V
1
) =
p(V
1
)
p(V
1
)+p(V
2
)
=
0:08
0:22
' 0:36
p
s
c
(V
2
) =
p(V
2
)
p(V
1
)+p(V
2
)
=
0:14
0:22
' 0:64
We now turn to the problem of computing the probabilities of possible L-worlds that result from
performing an action. For that purpose, we assume that each action postcondition has associated
the probability that this postcondition is achieved when the action is performed. Hence, actions
become structures of the form:
[ Pre
1
j (Post
1;1
; p
1;1
); : : : ; (Post
1;l(1)
; p
1;l(1)
);
.
.
.
Pre
m
j (Post
m;1
; p
m;1
); : : : ; (Post
m;l(m)
; p
m;l(m)
) ];
(4)
where p
i;j
is the probability that executing the action in context i leads to Post
i;j
. For each
context i, we furthermore assume that
 the postconditions are mutually exhaustive, i.e.,
P
l(i)
j=1
p
i;j
= 1
 the postconditions are mutually exclusive, i.e., for any two postcondition Post
i;j
1
and Post
i;j
2
and for any L-world v where Pre
i
holds, we have
v-Closest
K
j
L
(Post
i;j
1
) \ v-Closest
K
j
L
(Post
i;j
2
) = ;
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table2up = [ :rainy ^ ontable j (up; 0:8); (forward; 0:2);
rainy ^ ontable j (up; 0:6); (forward; 0:4);
:ontable j (true; 1) ]
back2up = [ :rainy ^ back j (up; 1);
rainy ^ back j (up; 0:8); (true; 0:2);
:back j (true; 1) ]
spin = [ forward _ back j (forward; 0:5); (back; 0:5);
:(forward _ back) j (true; 1) ]
wait = [ rainy j (:rainy; 0:1); (true; 0:9);
:rainy j (rainy; 0:1); (true; 0:9) ]
Figure 6: The cup domain actions with associated postcondition probabilities.
The last condition states that, starting from possible L-world v, the same possible L-world will
never be produced via two dierent postconditions of the action context that holds in v. Both
conditions can easily be ensured without loss of generality with respect to the original denition
of action descriptions (Denition 4) by adding appropriate contexts. To continue the cup domain
example, the postcondition probabilities of its actions are given in Figure 6.
Upon learning that action  is applied in a situation where s holds, our belief about the possible
L-worlds space is updated. We compute the probability distribution p
(;s)
over the possible L-
worlds space resulting from the performance of  in s, using Lewis's imaging [14], which can be
viewed as the probabilistic counterpart of updates in the sense of [13].
Denition 17 (Updated probability distribution) Let p be the a-priori probability distribu-
tion over the possible L-worlds space, K the background knowledge, s 2 L a formula, and let p
s
be the revision of p given that s holds. Let  be an action as in (4) with exhaustive and mutu-
ally exclusive postconditions. The update of p
s
given that  is applied in s, noted p
(;s)
, is the
probability distribution dened by
p
(;s)
(v
0
) =
X
v2Poss
K
j
L
(s)
0
@
p
s
(v)
l(i)
X
j=1
p(v
0
j v-Closest
K
j
L
(Post
i;j
)) p
i;j
1
A
;
where K [ v ` Pre
i
, and p(v
0
j v-Closest
K
j
L
(Post
i;j
)) is the conditional probability of v
0
, given
that the postcondition Post
i;j
is achieved by applying  in v.
The value of p(v
0
j v-Closest
K
j
L
(Post
i;j
)) can be computed as the revision of p(v
0
), given that
v-Closest
K
j
L
(Post
i;j
)|considered as a disjunction of conjunctions|holds. Since all actions in
the cup domain have the property of yielding exactly one L-world per eect alternative in every
precondition context,
7
v-Closest
K
j
L
(Post
i;j
) is always a singleton, and hence this probability is
either 0 or 1. Furthermore, since the postconditions of the same context are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive, each i will have exactly one Post
i;j
, for which this probability is 1. Thus, things
are simple for the cup domain. When applying, e.g., table2up in s
c
, the situation corresponds to
7
In Appendix B, we show that this property is a consequence of spannigness of and alternative-wise result
uniqueness as dened in Denition 25.
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one of the possible L-worlds V
4
or V
2
with the respective probabilities
p
(table2up;s
c
)
(V
4
) = p
s
c
(V
1
) (1  0:6 + 0 0:4) + p
s
c
(V
2
)  0 1
' 0:6 0:36 ' 0:22;
p
(table2up;s
c
)
(V
2
) = p
s
c
(V
1
) (0  0:6 + 1 0:4) + p
s
c
(V
2
)  1 1
' 0:4 0:36 + 1 0:64 ' 0:78:
4.2.3 Reckoning Probability Information in Possible Worlds Plans
Using the notions just described, we can use the probability information provided by the user
for computing the updated probability distributions p
(;s)
, telling which possible worlds result
from applying  in s with which probability. The question we tackle now is, how to assemble
these distributions to determine the average number of times an action will be performed when
executing a plan, or the probability to end up in one of its leaf nodes.
The basic tools we use here are Markov chains. For those readers unfamiliar with Markov
chain theory, we give a brief introduction in Appendix A, which they are advised to consult before
continuing with this section. All other readers should run into no problems from just skipping
Appendix A.
The basic idea of mapping plans to Markov chains is to associate a plan with an absorbing
Markov chain whose state set includes the plan's T -nodes set. Transient states of the chain cor-
respond to the T -nodes in the plan. Its absorbing states are interpreted to denote that the plan
execution is over, which may occur in two cases:
 the current world situation is represented by a leaf W -node of the plan, i.e., the plan does
not prescribe to apply any subsequent action in the current situation, either because the
corresponding W -node is incorrect, or because the situation it represents matches the goal;
 the current world situation is among those that should have been expected as a result of
a given action, but is not represented as a W -node successor of a T -node labeled with this
action in the plan, i.e, this T -node is incomplete.
To cope with these cases, we introduce two types of absorbing Markov states, additionally to
states representing T -nodes. Finish states are labeled with dummy actions applied in L-worlds
corresponding to W -node leaves of the plan, and Inc states are labeled with dummy actions that
are applied when the current world situation is not represented as a W -node that a complete plan
would have to include. The probability law of the Markov chain follows the probabilities provided
by the action formalism. Before giving the constructive denition how to generate the associated
Markov chain of a plan, let us give an example.
Figure 7 shows the Markov chain associated with the L-worlds version of the correct and
complete plan 
c
from Figure 4,
8
and its transition matrix. In 
c
, there is a transition from
the state labeled with start to the T -node labeled with spin through the L-world V
2
. Since
p
s
c
(V
2
) = 0:64, there is a transition in the Markov chain from the state labeled with start to the
state labeled with spin, with probability 0.64. The unique leaf of 
c
is labeled with V
4
. Hence, we
have one unique Finish state in the Markov chain. Since V
4
is obtained from back2up applied in V
3
and from table2up applied in V
1
, and since p
(back2up;V
3
)
(V
4
) = 0:8 and p
(table2up;V
1
)
(V
4
) = 0:6, we
have two transitions leading to the state labeled with nish(V
4
) in the chain: one with probability
0.8 from the state labeled with back2up , and one with probability 0.6 from the state labeled with
table2up .
Before giving an example of an incorrect and incomplete plan, let us rst formally dene the
chain associated with an arbitrary plan.
8
L-worlds version means: It is essentially the same plan like 
c
, only with its possible worlds W
i
exchanged by
its corresponding possible L-worlds V
i
.
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start
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Figure 7: The Markov chain associated with the L-worlds version of 
c
, and its transition matrix.
0 probability transitions are omitted in the graphical representation.
Denition 18 (Markov chain associated with a plan) Let 	 = (s; g;K;A) be a planning
problem description, P the associated probabilistic background knowledge, and  a plan for 	.
For any T -node  in  and any non-root T -node 
0
in , let
Succ(;) = fv j there exists a successor  of  in  labeled with vg)
Pre(
0
;) = the label of the predecessor of 
0
in 
Let furthermore T () be the set of T -nodes in , and let T
0
() be dened as follows
9
T
0
() = f Finish(v) j v is the label of a leaf of  g
[ f Inc(Start ; v) j v 2 Poss
K
j
L
(s) n Succ(Start ;) g
[ f Inc(; v) j  2  is a non-root T -node labeled with 
and v 2 r
K
j
L
(; Pre(;)) n Succ(;) g
The Markov chain associated with , noted by the triple hfX
t
; t = 0; 1; : : :g; T () [ T
0
(); i, is
the family fX
t
; t = 0; 1; : : :g of random variables taking values in the set of states T () [ T
0
(),
such that the conditional probability distribution  of X
t+1
is dened as:
(X
t+1
= 
0
j X
t
=  ) =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
p
s
(Pre(
0
;)) for  = Start and 
0
2 T ()
p
s
(v) for  = Start and 
0
= Finish(v)
p
s
(v) for  = Start, 
0
= Inc(Start ; v)
p
(;Pre(;))
(Pre(
0
;)) for  2 T () labeled with  and 
0
2 T ()
p
(;Pre(;))
(v) for  2 T () labeled with  and 
0
= Finish(v)
p
(;Pre(;))
(v) for  2 T () labeled with  and 
0
= Inc(; v)
1 for  2 T
0
() and 
0
= 
0 otherwise
9
For any Finish(v), resp. Inc(; v) Markov state, we assume that there exists a corresponding action called
nish(v), resp. inc(;v), which is dened in the analogous way used for start in denition 7.
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Figure 8: Incorrect and incomplete plan 
0
c
and its associated Markov chain with its transition
matrix
Figure 8 shows the incorrect and incomplete plan 
0
c
for our cup example, and its associated
Markov chain. The root T -node in 
0
c
is incorrect, because it has a W -node labeled with V
6
as
successor, and V
6
is not a possible L-world in s
c
. Hence, the transition probability from Start to
the state labeled with wait (the successor of the T -node labeled with V
6
in 
0
c
) is p
s
c
(V
6
) = 0.
Start is also incomplete: it should have a W -node labeled with V
2
as successor. Hence, there is a
transition from Start to the state labeled with inc(Start ; V
2
) in the Markov chain, with probability
p
s
c
(V
2
) = 0:64. The same case arises with spin , which should also result in V
2
. The two leaves of

0
c
being respectively labeled with V
3
and V
4
|the former leaf being incorrect|the two respective
Finish absorbing states are inserted in the Markov chain.
4.2.4 Dening the Rating Function for Possible Worlds Plans
The sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 deliver the tools for dening for possible worlds plans what this
section 4.2 is all about in general: a rating function on plans. In the light of the intended use
of the rating for dening correctness in the limit, we dene it as (and call it) the correctness and
completeness degree (ccd) of a plan. Like the proper notions of plan correctness and completeness,
ccd is dened inductively, starting at the nodes, and generalizing to plans then.
According to Denitions 8 and 9, there are three types of nodes of interest when dening
correctness and completeness of plans. These nodes are Start, the other T -nodes of the plan, and
the W -node leaves of the plan, to which we want to assign a degree of correctness and completeness.
The respective ccd function is specied in Denition 19. Before presenting it, we comment on the
respective denition steps and motivate our choice. We give the comments for L-worlds, but they
apply analogously to full worlds.
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T -node correctness degree. Denition 8 says a T -node is correct i it has no \wrong" W -
node successor. This means that if Succ(;) is the set of possible L-worlds labeling the W -nodes
successors of T -node  in plan , then Succ(;) must be included in the set of possible L-worlds
that are expected as labels of successors of  . These latter L-worlds are in Poss
K
j
L
(s) for the Start
node, and in r
K
j
L
(; v) for a non-root T -node labeled with  and whose W -node predecessor is
labeled with v. The correctness degree for T -nodes is then chosen to be inversely proportional to
the number of \wrong" L-worlds in Succ(;). Having n denote set dierence, the degree is more
exactly:
1
card(Succ(Start;)nPoss
K
j
L
(s))+1
for Start
1
card(Succ(;)nr
K
j
L
(;v))+1
for non-root T -nodes
Leaf W -node correctness. Denition 8 says a leaf is correct i it matches the goal g of the
problem, where \matching" means that the goal is derivable from the respective possible L-world.
This could be translated directly into the measure of leafW -node correctness by saying that leaves
matching the goal get a 1, and all others 0.
We want to allow for a bit more exibility. We assume the user has to dene a utility function
on L-worlds that is goal-oriented in the sense that it yields 1 i the goal is true in some L-world.
More precisely, we assume there is a function u : Poss
K
j
L
L ! [0; 1] such that
u(v; g)

= 1 for v and g s.t. K [ v ` g
< 1 otherwise
Given such a goal-oriented utility function u, the correctness degree for a leaf labeled with v is
u(v; g).
T -node completeness degree. Denition 9 says a T -node is complete i it has at least all
the \right" W -nodes successors. This means that if Succ(;) is the set of possible L-worlds
labeling the W -nodes successors of T -node  in plan , then Succ(;) must be a superset of
the set of possible L-worlds that are expected as labels of successors of  . We could then proceed
in analogy to T -node correctness to measure the extent to which this property holds. However,
there exists a more accurate measure here, because the L-worlds in Succ(;) can be considered as
random variables. Thus, we choose to measure the T -node completeness degree as the probability
of Succ(;); given that the initial situation s holds for  = Start, or, respectively, given that  is
applied in v, for a non-root T -node  labeled with  whose predecessor is labeled with v. Hence,
the degree is

p
s
(Succ(Start ;)) for Start
p
(;v)
(Succ(;)) for non-root T -nodes
There is no completeness degree for plan leaves, since completeness does not depend on them, see
Denition 9.
Node correctness and completeness degree. We choose to dene the degree of correctness
and completeness of each T -node as the product of the two respective degrees, and that of a leaf
as its correctness degree.
Plan correctness and completeness degree. Denitions 8 and 9 say a plan is correct and
complete i all its nodes of interest are correct and complete. We then choose to measure the extent
to which a plan is correct and complete, as the average degree of correctness and completeness per
node encountered during its execution. As the formal denition of the correctness and completeness
degree of a plan looks a bit lengthy, we don't repeat it here from the following Denition 19. It
involves essentially two terms, averaging over the ccd value of, rst, all T -nodes, and, second, all
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leaves, via the Finish states of the Markov chain.
10
These two terms are then weighed and added,
where the weight factors must sum to 1 and reect the relative importance given to nal execution
states and to non-nal ones.
The following denition summarizes the above informal explanations.
Denition 19 (Node and Plan Correctness and Completeness Degrees)
Let  be a plan for the planning problem description 	 = (s; g;K;A); P the probabilistic back-
ground knowledge, and u the goal-oriented utility function. For any task  in , let Succ(;) be
dened as follows:
Succ(;) = fv j there exists a successor  of  in  labeled with vg
Degree of root correctness and completeness: The degree of correctness and completeness
of Start in  wrt. 	 is
ccd
	
(Start;) =
p
s
(Succ(Start ;))
card(Succ(Start ;) n Poss
K
j
L
(s)) + 1
Degree of non-root T -node correctness and completeness: Let  be a non-root T -node in
 labeled with  and let  labeled with v be its predecessor in . The degree of correctness
and completeness of  in  wrt. 	 is
ccd
	
(;) =
p
(;v)
(Succ(;))
card(Succ(;) n r
K
j
L
(; v)) + 1
Degree of leaf correctness and completeness: Let  labeled with v be a leaf of . The degree
of correctness and completeness of  in  wrt. 	 is
ccd
	
(;) = u(v; g)
Degree of plan correctness and completeness: Let the Markov chain associated with  be
hfX
t
; t = 0; 1; : : :g; T [ T
0
; i. The degree of correctness and completeness of  wrt. 	 is
ccd
	
() = c
1
 ccd
T node
+ c
2
 ccd
leaf
;
where c
1
; c
2
are positive real constants such that c
1
+ c
2
= 1, and
ccd
T node
=
X
2T
 
ccd
	
(;) 
1
X
t=0
(X
t
=  j X
0
= Start)
!
X
2T
1
X
t=0
(X
t
=  j X
0
= Start)
ccd
leaf
=
X
Finish()2T
0

ccd
	
(;)  lim
t!1
(X
t
= Finish() j X
0
= Start)

Fortunately, the correctness and completeness degree for a plan can be computed from the fun-
damental matrix of its associated Markov chain, and from the matrix representing the transitions
from the transient states to the absorbing states of this chain, as stated in the following propo-
sition. To see the claimed equality, one has simply to substitute the elements of the respective
vectors for their values given in appendix A (for N
0
and (N  R)
0
), and in the proposition itself
(for U;U
0
and
!
1
); therefore, we give no formal proof here.
10
Denition 19 does not treat Inc states in a special way. In eect, the ccd rating does not properly reward if
the goal is accidentally achieved by an Inc node. As the planner itself or its rating is not the central topic of this
paper, we allow for this slight sloppyness, which simplies matters.
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Proposition 20 (Computation of ccd) Let  be a plan for the planning problem description
	 = (s; g;K;A); P the probabilistic background knowledge, and u the utility function. Let fur-
thermore N , resp. R be the fundamental matrix, resp. the matrix representing the transitions from
transient states to absorbing states, of the Markov chain associated with . The following equation
is correct:
ccd
	
() = c
1
(N
0
 U )
(N
0

!
1
)
+ c
2
(N  R)
0
 U
0
;
where
 N
0
is the rst row (i.e., the row corresponding to Start) of the matrix N of the chain,
 (N  R)
0
is the rst row of the matrix N  R,
 U is a column vector containing the degrees of completeness and correctness of the T -nodes
of the plan,

!
1
is a column vector of the same dimension as U , consisting only of 1's, and
 U
0
is the column vector containing the degree of correctness and completeness of theW -nodes
corresponding to the Finish states of the chain, and 0 for the Inc states.
As an immediate consequence of Proposition 20, we see that ccd
	
maps plans to [0; 1] and that
ccd
	
() = 1 i  is a correct and complete plan. Hence, we can state
Corollary 21 ccd
	
is a rating function.
Finally, let us give an example and compute ccd
	
c
(
0
c
), where 	
c
and P
c
are dened as before.
Dene u
c
(v; g) = 1 i K
c
[ v ` g, and 0 otherwise; and let c
1
= c
2
= 0:5. We have:
T
0
T
1
T
2
T
3
N
0
= ( 1 0:36 0:144 0 )
T
4
T
5
T
6
T
7
(N  R)
0
= ( 0:216 0:072 0:072 0:64 )
ccd
	
c
(T
0
;
0
c
) = 0:36=2 = 0:18
ccd
	
c
(T
1
;
0
c
) = 1=1 = 1
ccd
	
c
(T
2
;
0
c
) = 0:5=1 = 0:5
ccd
	
c
(T
3
;
0
c
) = 1=1 = 1
ccd
	
c
(V
3
;
0
c
) = 0
ccd
	
c
(V
4
;
0
c
) = 1
U =
T
0
T
1
T
2
T
3
0
B
B
@
0:18
1
0:5
1
1
C
C
A
U
0
=
T
4
T
5
T
6
T
7
0
B
B
@
1
0
0
0
1
C
C
A
Therefore,
ccd
	
c
(
0
c
) = 0:5 
0:18 + 0:36 + 0:072
1 + 0:36 + 0:144
+ 0:5  0:216 ' 0:31
As said previously, it is reasonable to demand that the rating of a plan be updatable during
the execution of this plan, according to additional information that becomes available. First,
this can be useful for an executor. If several plans are available for solving a problem, it can
begin the execution with the plan with the best a-priori rating, but interrupt this execution and
switch to another plan whenever this one becomes of higher rating. Second, this can be useful
for on-line planners, which incrementally improve the correctness and completeness of some part
of a plan during its execution. Based on the material just presented, it is straightforward to
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dene a continually updating version of ccd. Assume the current state of the plan execution (i.e.,
the currently executed task) is 
0
. We have to substitute in Denition 19 every occurrence of
X
0
= Start with X
0
= 
0
; moreover, the computation of the rating's update must use the N and
(N  R) matrices' rows corresponding to 
0
. Further detail concerning this issue lies outside of
this paper's scope.
4.3 Dening Correctness, Ltd.
We nally use the rating function to dene limited correctness, as announced several times above.
We do not consider the special case of possible worlds planning here; our planner pascale2, which
shows correctness in the limit with respect to the ccd function, is discussed in the subsequent
Section 5.
The notion of correctness in the limit is based on the following idea. Standard notions of planner
correctness and completeness (as given in Denitions 11 and 12) require that a planner generate
all correct and complete plans for a problem, and only these. Practically, that is too restrictive.
In particular, as long as nothing is assumed about preferences among correct and complete plans
(like plan cost or plan generation time, as briey addressed at the beginning of Section 4.2), it
is even worthless to require generating more than one such plan: one is as good as all the others
then. Furthermore, if the number of computation steps available to generate plans is small, then
even incomplete and incorrect plans may be of interest. Using a rating function for measuring the
\degree" of plan correctness and completeness, we consequently require that the plans a planner
delivers get more correct and more complete as run time increases, and that a correct and complete
plan is returned eventually at some step t. Of course, we do not require that a limitedly correct
planner is really given as much as t steps, nor do we assume that it stops running then: it may
continue, searching for plans that are not only correct and complete, but also maximize some other
plan quality function.
Denition 22 (Planner correctness in the limit) Let % be a family of rating functions. A
planner (P; A
P
) is correct in the limit wrt. %, i for all problems 	:
1. if there is a plan that is correct and complete wrt. 	, then the planner will eventually deliver
a correct and complete plan, i.e., then there exists t 2 A
P
(	) such that %
	
(P(	)(t)) = 1,
and
2. the ratings of the plans that the planner returns increase monotonically as planning steps
increase, i.e., for all t
1
; t
2
2 A
P
(	), if t
2
 t
1
then %
	
(P(	)(t
2
))  %
	
(P(	)(t
1
))
We will use the terms limited correctness, limitedly correct, resp., as short forms of correctness in
the limit, resp., correct in the limit.
Comparing this denition with the one of \pure" planner correctness (Denition 11), a remark-
able theoretical dierence is that limited correctness requires that at least one correct and complete
plan be returned, whereas the normal correctness does not. This may be interpreted as a avor of
\completeness in the limit" in this concept of limited correctness. The denition guarantees, on
the other hand, that a limitedly correct planner actually turns to a correct planner after the magic
number of t steps, for which there is no analogy with respect to completeness. Even with this
idea in mind, the monotonicity condition is more restrictive than might be considered necessary:
another reasonable variant of limited correctness could require planner correctness after the rst
correct and complete plan has been delivered, but not insist on monotonicity.
However, the very idea of planner correctness in the limit makes sense only if plan correctness
and completeness is the dominant factor in an overall measure of plan quality; and if this is the case,
then it seems reasonable to require a non-arbitrary, somewhat predictable behavior of the planner
output with respect to this factor. There may be additional criteria to discriminate dierent correct
and complete plans, measured by particular other quality sub-functions. We neither require nor
exclude these.
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Let us state some observations concerning the denition; all these observations follow directly
from the respective other denitions, which is why we do not formally prove them.
 While the denition of a rating function ensures that they all rate P(	)(t) with 1, i.e., item
(1) is independent of rating functions, it is not required that a plan 
1
rated higher than

2
by some rating function %, is also rated higher than 
2
by some other rating function %
0
.
Consequently, a planner that is limitedly correct wrt. % need not be so wrt. %
0
, because it
may violate the monotonicity condition (2) for %
0
.
 All correct planners that eventually return plans for all solvable problems, i.e., A
P
(	) 6= ;
for all solvable 	, are limitedly correct wrt. to all rating functions|as should intuitively be
expected. Consequently, all correct and complete planners are limitedly correct wrt. to all
rating functions.
 Incorrect, incomplete, and both incorrect and incomplete planners may be limitedly correct
wrt. some rating function.
The latter item is of most importance here. For good reasons, practical planners tend to be
highly incorrect and incomplete. The notion of correctness in the limit allows them to keep this
salvaging property, yet being put into a clear relationship to an arbitrarily neatly or idealistically
dened action calculus.
Of course, being able to establish this relationship does not come for free. Even assuming that
a limitedly correct planner is built in the ex ante fashion (i.e., have the action calculus rst, and
build the planner then), it still requires designing an appropriate rating function and building the
planner accordingly. However, we are convinced that this eort is worth being taken, if the goal
is to build planners delivering plans with a clear semantics, yet operating under realistic run time
constraints.
5 pascale2|An Anytime Uncertainty Planner
To complete the description of the case of our case study, it remains to sketch the planner pascale2
we have constructed; in particular, we have to show that it is limitedly correct wrt. the ccd rating
function. We summarize what we had to implement, sketch how we did it, draw the conclusions
from this sketch, and present an example. Note that pascale2 is not described here as the
objective of our work|in which case its description would have been more detailed|but just as
the byproduct or example of our view of planner construction. Aspects of it or its predecessor are
presented in more depth elsewhere [23, 24].
The work described in the previous sections yields precise functional specications for the
following planner components:
1. the possible worlds formalism for L-worlds, including the rj
L
function,
2. the computation of the probability distributions over the space of possible L-worlds,
3. the manipulation of possible worlds plans, and
4. the plan rating function ccd, including generation and handling of the Markov chains asso-
ciated with plans.
Implementing these components is far from trivial, at least if their run time is something to worry
about. Note in particular that computing the a-priori probability distribution p over the set of
possible L-worlds requires computing all possible L-worlds; this can be done prior to planning and
once for each new domain, but it is inherently costly. Given the possible L-worlds, computing
an approximation of p is easy and relatively ecient following the lines of [4]. Concerning the
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computation of the possible L-worlds resulting from the performance of an action, [5] describes an
algorithm for doing that relatively eciently, which is, however, not yet used in pascale2.
An important point for the following description is that pascale2 calculates and inserts into
the plan the exact result of applying an action in some possible L-world. As a consequence, all
T -nodes in a pascale2-plan are correct and complete, all pascale2-plans are complete, and only
their leaves may be incorrect. This, in turn, simplies the calculation of the ccd value of the plans,
since the rst term in the calculation (cf. Proposition 20) always equals the c
1
constant.
Even if the issue of how to implement the above components is crucial for obtaining a usable
planner, we sacrice a more thorough description for saving space and refer to the given references.
The pascale2 component that must be discussed, however, is:
5. the search strategy for traversing the space of possible L-world plans.
This strategy is not constructively specied by the formalism; it is just constrained if the planner
is supposed to be correct in the limit. pascale2 is not correct and not complete, and we have
mentioned above (4.3) that the order in which plans are generated is crucial for such planners'
property of being limitedly correct, because of the monotonicity requirement for the plan rating.
Figure 9 species a somewhat simplied version of pascale2's core in pseudo-code and in-
formally describes its top-level sub-procedures. Obviously, it performs a best-rst backtracking
search through a search space consisting of plans. Note that this procedure practically excludes
completeness of the planner using it, as it will discard, among others, all correct and complete
plans whose quality is not higher than the one of an already found correct and complete plan.
While this is the case for pascale2, it is in no way necessary. Variants of the other well-known
basic search strategies could also have been used for this basic procedure.
The step size (in the sense of the planner denition 10) is an iteration through the mainwhile-
loop. The procedure is trivially any-step for this step denition, i.e., it can return a plan after
any step, namely, best-plan. (We will show a protocol of the respective best-plans for the example
problem 	
c
below.) Owing to the use of the global variable best-plan, the procedure can trivially
be made interruptible at any time after the initialization phase, provided that the assignment to
this variable within the while loop is atomic.
The measure used to order plans is given by the sub-procedure quality(	;). The value it
returns can be identical to ccd
	
(), but we do not require that this be the case. In general, one
might use more sophisticated quality functions that take, e.g., operator cost, execution time, or
plan generation time into account, maybe even weighing it with the probability data provided by
the Markov chain. pascale2 allows for the exibility of using such a quality function. However,
to be correct in the limit, it suces that the planning procedure use a quality function that is
order-preserving wrt. ccd in the sense of the following lemma. Formally proving this lemma would
be technically eortful, which is why we don't do it here; the intuitive argument, however, should
be obvious, given the search strategy dened by the o-line-plan procedure and the role played by
the quality procedure.
Lemma 23 The procedure o-line-plan in Figure 9 yields a limitedly correct planner, if for all
problems 	 its sub-procedure quality(	;) is order-preserving wrt. ccd
	
in the sense that
1. if quality(	;
1
) > quality(	;
2
), then ccd
	
(
1
)  ccd
	
(
2
), and
2. if there is a correct and complete plan for 	, then there is a plan  such that ccd
	
() = 1,
and for all 
0
: if ccd
	
(
0
) < 1, then quality(	;) > quality(	;
0
).
To give an impression of pascale2's behavior, we show its results for the cup domain problem
	
c
. We choose quality(	;) = ccd
	
(), i.e., correctness in the limit is guaranteed. Figure 10
shows how the quality of the available best plan monotonically increases over run time, ending up
at 1 after 3.6 seconds; the respective plan 
00
c
is shown in Figure 11.
Looking at gure 11, one can see how pascale2 expands the current plan in depth rst manner,
expanding the most probable outcome of the last inserted task rst. Consequently, a plan that is
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function o-line-plan (problem,max-step) =
best-plan := empty-plan(problem);
search-space := [ best-plan ];
current-step := 0;
while search-space 6= [] and current-step < max-step
current-step := current-step + 1;
current-plan := head(search-space);
if quality(problem,current-plan) > quality(problem,best-plan)
then best-plan := current-plan ;
T := last-inserted-task(current-plan);
L := select-maximal-probable(current-plan,T,problem);
if L 6= nil
then successors := order(expand(current-plan,L,problem));
search-space := append(successors,tail(search-space)) 
end;
return best-plan
empty-plan(	) builds a plan embryo containing the Start T -node and the possible
models of the initial situation of problem 	.
quality(	;) returns a quality value of plan  for the problem 	.
last-inserted-task() returns the lastly inserted T -node in plan .
select-maximal-probable(; ;	) returns the leaf of plan  that is maximally proba-
ble to be reached from T -node  , unless one of the leaves that can be reached from
 matches the goal of problem 	. In that case, returns the leaf that is maximally
probable to be reached from Start and does not match this goal. If there is none,
then returns nil.
expand(; l;	) returns the list of valid plans resulting from the expansion of plan 
at leaf l, using the available actions of problem 	. Returns nil for correct and
complete plans.
order() orders the list of plans  in decreasing order of the quality(	;) procedure.
Figure 9: pascale2's core procedure (simplied), and its top-level sub-procedures. It is assumed
that the utility of all T -nodes equals 1.
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not yet correct and complete in general may well correctly and completely describe what happens
most probably if its execution is started, although it is not yet nished. This behavior of pascale2
is the clue to the rapid increase of the ccd value at the beginning of the run time. (after 0.8 seconds,
ccd already has a value of 0.87.)
Since quality equals ccd for this experiment, there is no strictly better plan than 
00
c
. As the
criterion for returning other plans is a proper increase in quality, pascale2 does not return any
other correct and complete plans, e.g., the 
c
plan discussed earlier. Changing the comparison
criterion between the quality of the current plan and the best-plan to  would lead to returning
additional correct and complete plans. Note that the goal-oriented utility function for this example
was specially designed for the didactic purpose of yielding a relatively slow convergence towards a
correct and complete plan; using dierent such functions, pascale2 would have generated other
plans|in most cases considerably faster than here.
pascale2 is implemented in Standard ML on a SUN Sparc IPX workstation.
6 Conclusion and Open Issues
The purpose of an action formalism is to specify the reasoning about prerequisites and consequences
of actions that an ideally rational agent should perform. A planner has to do reasoning about
prerequisites and consequences of actions, but if it insists on doing it in an idealistic way, then it is
likely to fail on most realistic usage constraints for practical applications. Consequently, it seems
the camp of interesting planners and the camp of interesting action formalisms are way apart.
Our idea to build a bridge between the two camps is to interpret the reasoning behavior of
planners as an approximation of the ideal reasoning as specied by the formalism. If a planner is
correct in the limit and is given enough time, then it is guaranteed to deliver plans up to the ideal
as set by the action formalism; given less time, the degrees of incorrectness and incompleteness
of plans found until then can be quantied by the plan rating, providing an exact measure of the
deviation relative to the ideal. Designing planners in this spirit of ex ante helps solve the often-
deplored problem of lack of formal background for plans and planners, and it provides a handle
for planner designers to making use of work from the camp of action formalisms.
The case study we have provided along with the generic piers for building such bridges demon-
strates that they cannot only be built between highly restrictive formalisms and very classical
planners. Moreover, the study is a written testimony for the fact that we do not claim turning
an action formalism into a planner is always straightforward. Maybe there is a straightforward
planner for every action formalism (one for the possible (L-)worlds formalism was the forerunner
of pascale2, called pascale [23]), but that is not our point. Starting from requirements for a
particular planner (like expressivity of the action language, anytime behavior, or quality features
for plans), we assume that the action formalism to lay under this particular planner will nearly
never be available o-the-shelf. The eort for restricting the formalism, designing plans, dening
the rating function, and nally building the planner will still be considerable. But we think the
potential result is worth a try.
The study also exemplies or reveals a number of open issues in the general idea of building
planners ex ante. Let us address some of them, starting with special issues and turning more and
more general. We will not discuss pascale2 in particular: it was just used as the experiment in
this study and is more thoroughly discussed elsewhere [24].
Alternative denitions of correctness in the limit. While notions like limited correctness
of planners and correctness and completeness of plans will play key rolls in every method for
turning action formalisms into planners, they may well be dened dierently, reecting dierent
assumptions or domain characteristics. Let us rst consider limited correctness.
Denition 22 requires monotonicity of the rating function % over time. However, other versions
of limited correctness can be thought of. First, monotonicity of % might be considered unnecessary
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during the phase where no correct and complete plan has been found yet. This would enable the
planner to choose more freely which plan to consider currently best. However, revisiting Figure 10,
pascale2's rating converges smoothly (modulo the inevitable discontinuity) towards 1 for 	
c
and
the parameter setting chosen; such a smooth convergence would at least be discouraged by skipping
the monotonicity requirement. Second|just pushing further the argument for freedom of choice|
even after having found a correct and complete plan, the planner might be allowed to return plans
that are incorrect and incomplete, leaving as the only constraint on limited completeness that the
planner return a correct and complete plan sometime.
The point is: the monotonicity requirement does no harm; in particular it does in no way
(as one might suspect) force the planner into local plan optima from which there is no escape.
However, it restricts the choice of possible rating functions. It is not yet determined whether this
particular restriction is in general wise or obstructive.
Plan quality vs. rating functions. Closely related with the previous point, it is a crucial
question, what the determining factor is for considering plans \good" or \bad". If plan correctness
and completeness is not this factor, then the monotonicity requirement for rating functions will
most probably be troublesome. We assume there may exist domains in which this is the case.
Consequently, it remains an open question to dene a more general version of limited correctness
that constrains the planner behavior, yet allows an arbitrary quality function to guide the planner
behavior|or at least a quality function that is less restricted than by the order-preservingness
conditions in Lemma 23. In pascale2, we allow for using much more general quality denitions
than those yielding limited correctness, involving, e.g., operator cost. This very fact shows that we
see the practical necessity to do something about a more generous combination between a strict
rating function and a general quality measure.
The value of computation. Russell and Wefald [19] advocate the idea to meta-reason during
planning, to determine whether or not acting based on the plan developed so far pays more than
trying to enhance the plan quality by further planning. The idea is to dene the expected utility
of developing the recent plan and weigh it against the expected utility of acting right away.
This idea does not depend on whether or not the planner is based on some action formalism.
However, it nicely suits our particular blueprint for basing planners on action formalisms using
planner correctness in the limit. In particular, expected plan rating increase can be a major factor
in determining the expected utility of further developing the plan. It is a point for future work to
explicitly include the possibility for the meta-reasoning view into this blueprint.
Action formalisms to base planners on. In the introduction of this paper, we have stated
a basic hypothesis for our work (see the paragraph labeled with (1)), involving the requirement
that the formalism to lay under the ex ante planner construction be \reasonable". We still have
to explain what this means.
In fact, we do not see any theoretical constraints on the formalism. In particular, it need not
be decidable or even itself be in any way eciently implementable, because we have assumed that
a planner implementation use a restricted version of the formalism or an implementation that
approximates the real results of the formalism itself. In the latter case, the formalism is of course
only the approximative formal basis of the plans that the planner generates, which might be a
drawback for the overall goal of the ex ante planner construction of obtaining plans and planner
behavior with a clear semantics.
Consequentially, the only|inherently fuzzy|requirement on the formalism itself is that it
allow to dene a restricted version or approximation that both makes sense and is eciently
implementable. The latter point is crucial if the goal is building practical planners, as reasoning
in its action formalism lies at the heart of every planner. We have no recipe or theory for telling
which formalism allows for dening a reasonable restriction, or how to obtain it.
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General applicability of the approach. We have presented our work as a case study for our
supposedly more general method of ex ante planner construction. The crucial question is whether
this method is really generally applicable|be it in precisely the way we have described here, or in
some variation regarding the steps, notions, and denitions we have used. This question cannot
yet be answered conclusively.
In particular, while we see a fair amount of work that is closely related to single aspects of ours,
we are not aware of other work under the same or a comparable perspective. To repeat pointers
to related work from above, there is related work
 about anytime generation of plans [7]|but it does not ground the plan quality in the rm
semantics provided by an action formalism;
 about giving plans a formal semantics [15]|but it is ex post, hence does not help the planner
designers, and does not deal with limited correctness;
 about implementing given formal action or planner models [2, 16]|but it strives for imple-
menting a planner that \directly" uses the formalism, which is instructive for understanding
the formalism and the particular planning aspect it focuses on, but is a dead end with respect
to building practical planners based on more expressive formalisms.
Consequently, answering the question whether our proposed method of planner construction is
generally applicable, would amount to generalizing from one complex experience, which, as common
sense tells, is better avoided. However, both this experience and theoretical analysis did not reveal
any very basic obstacles, and our rst results reported here appear suciently promising that
our plans for further work include studying further cases, i.e., attempting to turn other action
formalisms into other planners, and study the general pattern behind.
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Figure 12: A Markov chain and its transition matrix.
A Markov Chain Basics
A Markov chain is a stochastic process whose probabilistic transition through a set of states at
some instant t+ 1 depends only on the state at the preceding instant t, and not on the states the
chain passed through prior to time t. If, furthermore, the transition probabilities do not depend
on t but remain stationary over time, the chain is said to be stationary. Stationary chains can by
denition be represented by a single transition matrix relating the probability of the succeeding
state to the current state.
Denition 24 (Markov chain, transition matrix) AMarkov chain is a family of random vari-
ables fX
t
; t = 0; 1 : : :g taking values in a set of states S, such that the conditional probability
distribution  of the state at time t + 1 has the following property for all t 2 f0; 1; : : :g and all
s
0
; : : : ; s
t+1
2 S:
(X
t+1
= s
t+1
j X
t
= s
t
; : : : ; X
0
= s
0
) = (X
t+1
= s
t+1
j X
t
= s
t
)
A Markov chain is stationary if and only if for all t 2 f0; 1; : : :g and all s
i
; s
j
2 S:
(X
t+1
= s
j
j X
t
= s
i
) = m
ij
for some constant m
ij
2 [0; 1]. The transition matrix for a stationary Markov chain is the matrix
with entries m
ij
.
A classical example of a process that can be modeled as a stationary Markov chain is a random
walk. A particle moves between ve points p
1
; : : : ; p
5
on a line. At each step, it can go from one
point to the right with probability r, and from one point to the left with probability 1   r. It
moves until it reaches one of the two boundaries of the line, and remains at this boundary. The
corresponding stationary chain and its transition matrix are shown in Figure 12.
We are interested here in a special type of stationary chain called absorbing chain. An absorbing
chain is a stationary chain with two types of states: transient states, which can be left on at least
one path that never returns, and absorbing states, which cannot be left once entered. It is easy to
see that the random walk is an absorbing chain. p
1
and p
5
are absorbing, while the other states are
transient. The transition matrix of an absorbing chain can be divided into 4 submatrices as shown
below, where the submatrix Q denotes transitions from transient to transient states, R denotes
transitions from transient to absorbing states, I is the identity matrix, and O consists only of 0's.
trans:
abs:

trans: abs:
Q R
O I

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These submatrices can be used to compute quantitative information about the process modeled as
an absorbing chain. The matrix I   Q always has an inverse N , called the fundamental matrix,
where N = (I  Q)
 1
=
P
1
t=0
Q
t
. The denition of N implies that its ij
th
element is the average
number of times transient state s
j
will be entered before an absorbing state is reached, given that
we are in transient state s
i
. That is, for two transient states s
i
and s
j
:
N
i;j
=
1
X
t=0
(X
t
= s
j
jX
0
= s
i
)
Furthermore, the ij
th
element of matrix N  R is the probability of reaching absorbing state s
j
,
given that we are in transient state s
i
. That is, for transient state s
i
and absorbing state s
j
:
(N  R)
i;j
= lim
t!1
(X
t
= s
j
jX
0
= s
i
)
Note that this probability of reaching an absorbing state can also be viewed as the average number
of times the absorbing state will be entered before the process becomes stable.
B The Equivalence Between Using Worlds and L-worlds
In Section 4.1.2, we postponed the proof of the claim that using full worlds and using L
c
-worlds is
equivalent in the cup domain. This is the place to deliver it.
What we are heading for is a statement of the form
K
c
[ r
K
c
(; s) is logically equivalent to K
c
[ r
K
c
j
L
c
(; s)
for every formula s 2 L
c
and every cup domain action . There are dierent ways to get there.
The tedious one is to check it for all actions and all sets of possible worlds. Instead, we state two
more generally applicable conditions, the conjunction of which is sucient for the equivalence to
hold. These two conditions are true for the cup domain.
11
The rst condition needed is spanningness, as stated in Denition 13. For the cup domain, it
can be easily veried that L
c
is spanning wrt. K
c
.
The second condition requires each postcondition Post
i;j
of  to be suciently precise, so as
to ensure, for any possible world w verifying Pre
i
, the uniqueness of the possible world having the
minimal dierence with w, among the possible worlds veriying Post
i;j
. This property, which we
call alternative-wise result uniqueness, is formally dened as follows.
Denition 25 (Alternative-wise result uniqueness) Let  be an action as in Denition 4. 
yields alternative-wise unique results i for every possible world w and every precondition Pre
i
of
:
if w [K j= Pre
i
and j 2 f1; : : : ; l(i)g
then there is exactly one possible world w
0
such that Di(w;w
0
) is (set inclusion)
minimal among the possible worlds satisfying Post
i;j
.
Again, it can be easily veried that all actions in the cup domain are alternative-wise result unique.
In fact, this property already got used in Section 4.2.2 (see Footnote 7).
The required proposition, then, is the following. As stated above, its antecedent is true for the
cup domain; hence it implies the required equivalence.
Proposition 26 (Equivalence Theorem) Let  be an action, L a subset of the ground atoms
of L, and K the background knowledge.
If L is spanning w.r.t. K and if  yields alternative-wise unique results, then K [ r
K
(; s) is
logically equivalent to K [ r
K
j
L
(; s) for every formula s 2 L.
11
Note that [3] contains a similar proposition stating the reqiured equivalence (Proposition 15). However, it is
not applicable here because the independence property is not true for L
c
.
36 B THE EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN USING WORLDS AND L-WORLDS
Proof Let w be a possible world, wj
L
its corresponding possible L-world, Pre
i
a precondition
of , such that K [ w j= Pre
i
, and let Post
i;j
(j 2 f1; : : : l(i)g) be a postcondition of . The
equivalence is demonstrated in three steps.
 By alternative-wise result uniqueness, there is a unique possible world w
0
among those ver-
ifying Post
i;j
such that for every possible world w
00
6= w
0
verifying Post
i;j
Di(w;w
0
) 
Di(w;w
00
). This implies that w
0
is the unique possible world verifying Post
i;j
such that for
every possible world w
00
6= w
0
verifying Post
i;j
:
{ Di(w;w
0
)  Di(w;w
00
), or
{ every causal change set of (w;w
0
) is a causal change set of (w;w
00
) and not vice versa.
Hence, according to the closeness denition on possible worlds (Denition 3)
w-Closest
K
(Post
i;j
) = fw
0
g (5)
 By denition of L-worlds, w implies wj
L
, and, as L is spanning, wj
L
[ K implies w [ K.
Hence wj
L
[K is logically equivalent to w [K, and
wj
L
[K j= Pre
i
i w [K j= Pre
i
(6)
This means that the same branch of  gets applied in a possible world and in its corresponding
possible L-world.
 Let us prove that:
wj
L
-Closest
K
j
L
(Post
i;j
) = fw
0
j
L
g (7)
where w
0
j
L
is the possible L-world corresponding to w
0
.
First, recall that wj
L
-Closest
K
j
L
(Post
i;j
) = fw
0
j
L
g i w
0
j
L
veries Post
i;j
(i.e., w
0
j
L
[
K j= Post
i;j
), and for every possible L-world w
00
j
L
6= w
0
j
L
verifying Post
i;j
, we have
Di(wj
L
; w
0
j
L
)  Di(wj
L
; w
00
j
L
).
By alternative-wise result uniqueness, we know that for every possible world w
00
6= w
0
veri-
fying Post
i;j
, we have Di(w;w
0
)  Di(w;w
00
). By spanningness, there must be X;Y that
are sets of ground literals of L not in L, such that
Di(wj
L
; w
0
j
L
) [X  Di(wj
L
; w
00
j
L
) [ Y
where w
0
j
L
and w
00
j
L
, by an argument similar to that of (6), both statisfy Post
i;j
.
Since X and Di(wj
L
; w
0
j
L
), as well as Y and Di(wj
L
; w
00
j
L
) are disjoint sets, it must be
the case that
{ Di(wj
L
; w
0
j
L
) = Di(wj
L
; w
00
j
L
) and X  Y , or that
{ Di(wj
L
; w
0
j
L
)  Di(wj
L
; w
00
j
L
) and X  Y
However, the rst case cannot occur: it implies that w
0
j
L
= w
00
j
L
, which by spaningness
implies that w
0
= w
00
, contradicting the hypothesis. Hence we have shown that for every pos-
sible L-world w
00
j
L
6= w
0
j
L
satisfying Post
i;j
it is true that Di(wj
L
; w
0
j
L
)  Di(wj
L
; w
00
j
L
).
Thus, we have proved (7).
 From (5), (7), and spaningness, we have
K [wj
L
-Closest
K
j
L
(Post
i;j
) is logically equivalent to K [ w-Closest
K
(Post
i;j
);
which, using (6), transfers from single worlds and postconditions to arbitrary formulas and the
result functions r
K
and r
K
j
L
, respectively. As w;; Pre
i
were chosen arbitrarily, the claimed
equivalence follows.
